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Abstract
The business literature suggests that exporters either use trade intermediaries or own
foreign sales representations. Standard trade models are silent about this choice. We de-
velop a model where producers differ with respect to competitive advantage and where trade
intermediaries arise endogenously. Intermediaries allow producers to access a foreign mar-
ket at lower fixed costs, but the lack of enforceable cross-country contracts reduces variable
revenue. Producers select into different export modes along their characteristics. Relative
prevalence of trade intermediation is stronger the bigger the risk of expropriation in the for-
eign country and the lower the severity of contractual frictions, the degree of heterogeneity
amongst producers, and the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The volume of bi-
lateral trade and the stock of FDI appear as complements in the model. Tentative empirical
evidence confirms the main predictions.
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1 Introduction
Conventional trade models usually ignore how firms export to foreign markets.1 The traditional
assumption that producers sell directly to consumers in foreign countries may be innocuous
for many important questions. However, taken at face value, it is plainly unrealistic. The
international business literature (e.g., Peng and Ilinitch, 1998) makes clear that selling to a
foreign market usually requires either a foreign partner or a wholly owned foreign sales affiliate.
The optimal choice between these two major export modes is an important strategic issue for
any exporting firm.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report that retail and wholesale distribution costs are
equivalent to an ad valorem tax of 55 percent. Hence, in order to understand trade costs in
general, we need a better comprehension of distribution costs in particular. In this paper, we
suggest a simple theoretical framework in which exporters face a choice in how to distribute
their goods to a foreign market: either through a local partner or through an own wholesale
affiliate.
We model the endogenous emergence of an important institution usually neglected in stan-
dard analysis: trade intermediaries. Those firms enjoy easier access to foreign markets. However,
as international transactions involve at least two jurisdictions, contracts are particularly hard
to enforce, so that interaction with an intermediary exposes the producer to a hold-up problem.
The optimal response of the producer is to restrict output for the export market, which lowers
average variable revenue. The trade-off between fixed-cost savings and lower variable revenue
pins down the producers’ optimal choice of export mode.
Clearly, as arms-length transaction between the producers and the intermediaries are subject
to hold-up problems, producers may wish to internalize sales activities by setting up a foreign
sales affiliate. Internalization forgoes the fixed-cost savings available with intermediation, but
avoids relationship-specific distortions. We embed this trade-off in a setup akin to Melitz (2003),
where firms differ with respect to the idiosyncratic components of variable distribution costs
or preferences as well as with respect to their labor productivity. We derive an interesting
sorting pattern: firms with low distribution costs, strong brand reputation, and high productivity
1Recent models study the question whether firms export or produce abroad. This paper instead focuses on
the choice of export modes.
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internalize foreign sales activities, while those with medium realizations of those variables prefer
to use trade intermediaries. The relevant firm characteristics correlate with firm size, so that
the paper predicts selection of firms along their sizes.
There is massive systematic and anecdotal evidence on the importance of trade intermedi-
aries. Peng, Zhou and York (2006) find for the U.S. that more than 45 percent of export sales
in 68 out of 97 product categories are handled by export intermediaries (see their Tables 4 and
5 for 1998, pp. 296f).2 Our model also stresses the role of foreign wholesale affiliates. Buch,
Kleinert, Lipponer and Toubal (2005) report that about 39% of all German subsidiaries abroad
are active as wholesellers. They make up a substantial share – about 30% – of the total stock
of German foreign direct investment (FDI). In the proposed model, to the extent that exports
are channeled through sales affiliates, FDI and trade are complements. This may rationalize
the finding discussed by Neary (2007) that bilateral FDI stocks seem to decrease with bilateral
distance, much as bilateral trade does. Note that Neary’s observation is in conflict with the
standard proximity-concentration view of FDI, where trade and investment are substitutes.
Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) show that about 13% of all U.S. exporters sell to own
foreign affiliates (related parties), and that their combined export market share is about 30%. It
follows that the average firm exporting to own wholesale affiliates has larger export revenue than
the average firm selling through an alternative channel. This pattern is fully consistent with the
evidence (e.g., surveyed by Helpman, 2006) that only the largest firms engage in FDI. Business
literature (e.g., Ellis, 2000) suggests that exports that are not channeled via intermediaries or
an own foreign subsidiary are only a negligible share of of total exports. Those ‘direct’ exports
typically stem from unsolicited orders, often through direct contact of a buyer via phone or
mail. This is is an opportunity that almost any producer with some international visibility has
at some point in time; hence, the number of concerned firms may be fairly large while the role
of direct exports for total trade is small. Bringing the available evidence together, it seems very
likely that firms sort according to their size in line with the pattern predicted in this paper.3
Besides the predicted sorting pattern, our framework has additional testable implications.
2Trabold (2002) provides evidence for France.
3Available firm-level data usually does not provide information on the mode of serving a foreign market
(‘directly’, through an intermediary, or via an own affiliate). Hence, direct evidence for the proposed sorting
pattern is hard to come by. There are several international attempts to improve the availability of data so that a
full-fledged empirical analysis should become possible in the near future.
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First, the prevalence of sales through trade intermediaries relative to sales through own affili-
ates does neither depend on geographical distance between two countries nor on their respective
market sizes. Second, relative prevalence decreases in the strength of contractual imperfections
(which may be good/sector-specific) but it increases in the (country-specific) risk of expropri-
ation in the foreign country. Third, relative prevalence increases as firms become more homo-
geneous in terms of their underlying characteristics (productivity, quality, tradability of goods).
Fourth, when systematic trade costs go up, both the stock (and flow of) wholesale FDI between
two countries and the volume of bilateral trade (in both modes) fall. Hence, in this scenario,
trade and FDI appear as complements.
At present, data on export modes in the sense of our model is not available. However, when
using the ratio of related-party over non-related-party trade reported by the US Census at the
industry level as a proxy for the relative prevalence of intermediation we find support in favor
of our hypotheses. Fortunately, in several countries there are initiatives to improve the data
situation so that formal testing should be possible in the medium-run.4
Our work is related to at least four important strands of literature. First, as in Grossman
and Helpman (2002) or Antras and Helpman (2004, 2008) we allow for incomplete contracts to
affect the boundaries of firms.5 Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007) provide empirical
evidence that products’ revealed contractability plays a role in explaining the intra-firm share of
imports.6 We set up a theoretical model to reproduce the set of stylized facts discussed above,
and assume that contractual imperfections arise when legal entities of two different countries (a
producer and the foreign trade intermediary) interact, but that the relation between wholesale
agents and retailers is free from frictions. There is an interesting literature that analyzes falling
trade costs trade when producers and retailers interact strategically (see, e.g., Raff and Schmitt,
2005 or 2006). We abstract on strategic issues and rather focus on the endogenous emergence of
trade intermediaries, the sorting of producers across export modes and the role of contractual
frictions as determination of trade costs.
Second, our work is related to existing literature on trade intermediaries. Hanson and Feen-
4See, i.a., the initiative coordinated by Bruegel and CEPR www.bruegel.org/Public/SimplePage.php?ID=1720.
5Whereas their focus is on a sourcing decision which involves the location of input production, we analyze the
pattern of sourcing distribution services.
6The paper is marked “preliminary and uncomplete”.
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stra (2001) study the role of Hong-Kong as a center of trade intermediation. Schro¨der, Trabold
and Tru¨bswetter (2005) discuss trade intermediation in a simple two-country monopolistic com-
petition model of international trade. However, in their model, there is no endogenous choice
of export modes, and firms are identical. The business economics literature on trade interme-
diation, that we have cited before, is strongly empirical in nature and does not offer general
equilibrium modeling.
Third, a growing number of papers model the distribution to foreign markets in more detail.
Rauch (1999) or Krautheim (2007a) analyze the role of networks; Arkolakis (2006) models
exporters’ marketing decisions on foreign markets.
Fourth, a number of recent papers discusses the endogenous sorting of firms into different
modes of serving foreign markets. In Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), henceforth HMY,
firms either produce locally and export to a foreign market, or they engage in horizontal FDI
and produce abroad. Krautheim (2007b) develops an interesting generalization of that model,
allowing firms to use an additional mode of selling to the foreign market, namely via export
supporting FDI. His model allows to address the facts discussed by Neary (2007), but does not
address import intermediation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
solves the game between the trade intermediary and the producer. Section 3 derives the key
propositions of the paper: it shows how firms sort into different export modes according to their
attributes and derives predictions on the relative prevalence of either export modes and the trade-
FDI relationship in general equilibrium. Section 4 provides tentative empirical evidence, and
Section 5 concludes. Proofs of our results and intermediate steps of calculations are contained
in the Appendix.
2 Model setup
In this section we describe a model with heterogeneous firms in which we introduce the endoge-
nous emergence of trade intermediaries. We build on HMY who offer a simple way to discuss
the prevalence of export modes in an environment with asymmetric countries and bilateral trade
costs. Our model differs from existing treatments in that it allows for a broader characterization
of firm heterogeneity.
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The world consists of N countries, indexed j = 1, ..., N, who may differ according to the size
of their labor forces. In each country, heterogeneous firms produce varieties of a differentiated
good and interact under conditions of monopolistic competition. We allow for exogenous firm
turnover, so that in a stationary environment at each instant of time a measure δ¯ > 0 of firms
dies and enters. Firm death is the only source of discounting.
2.1 Demand structure
Each country j is populated by a representative household who inelastically supplies Lj units of
labor to a perfectly competitive labor market. Preferences are a CES aggregate of differentiated
goods, each indexed by ω:
Uj =
[∫
ω∈Ωj
[ζ (ω)xij (ω)]
ρ dω
]1/ρ
. (1)
The parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1) describes the degree of substitutability between any pair of varieties.
Ωj is the set of available varieties in country j. The quantity xij (ω) denotes consumption of a
variety produced in country i, i = 1, ..., N. Our specification slightly generalizes the standard
CES case in that it adds the parameter ζ (ω) ≥ 0 which captures the brand reputation of variety
ω as perceived by the household.7 The larger ζ (ω), the bigger is the contribution of variety ω
to overall utility.8
Each variety is produced by a single firm. Since there is free entry, in equilibrium firms do
not make profits. Thus, labor is the only source of income, and the budget constraint reads
wjLj ≥
∫
ω∈Ωj
pij (ω)xij (ω) dω, (2)
where wj denotes the wage rate that is determined endogenously in equilibrium.
Maximizing (1) subject to (2), we find the following demand function for a variety ω from
country i
xij (ω) = Hj
ζ (ω)σ−1
pij (ω)
σ , (3)
7Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) introduce a similar weighting factor in their representation of utility.
8In principle, our setting allows to read equation (1) as a CES production function of a competitive final output
good producer. Then, we study trade in inputs rather than in final goods. The predictions of the model do not
hinge on the interpretation. This feature is highly welcome for the empirical exercise of Section 4, since the data
do not allow to dissect trade in final goods from trade in inputs.
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where Hj ≡ wjLjP σ−1j and Pj =
(∫ nj
0 [pij (ω) /ζ (ω)]
1−σ dω
)1/(1−σ)
. Pj is the price index dual
to (1), nj is the measure of the set Ωj and σ ≡ 1/ (1− ρ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between varieties.
2.2 Product heterogeneity and exporting via own wholesale affiliates
Monopolistically competitive producers differ with respect to a vector of characteristics {ζ (ω) , τ (ω) , a (ω)} ,
where ζ (ω) is the taste parameter introduced above, a (ω) > 0 denotes the labor input re-
quirement for producing one unit of variety ω, and τ (ω) ≥ 1 refers to variety-specific variable
distribution costs of the iceberg type (marketability). Realistically, we assume that this cost
occurs regardless of whether a good is traded internationally or not. However, in international
transactions, total variable trade costs are τ ij (ω) = τ¯ ijτ (ω) , where τ¯ ij ≥ 1 accounts for trans-
portation costs from exporting from country i to country j and may be thought of as a function
of distance. We refer to τ¯ ij as to the systematic component of trade costs, and of τ (ω) as the
idiosyncratic component.9
Firm ω’s variable cost function in country i is given by ci (ω) = y (ω) a (ω)wi where y (ω)
is the quantity of output. Regarding their cost structure, firms do not differ across countries.
We map the vector of firm characteristics {ζ (ω) , τ (ω) , a (ω)} into a scalar measure of effective
firm-level productivity Φ (ω) ≡ ζ (ω) / [a (ω) τ (ω)] . It turns out that Q ≡ Φσ−1 is a measure of
competitive advantage which fully characterizes firm behavior.
Following the structure of the entry process introduced by Hopenhayn (1992) and simplified
in Melitz (2003), prospective entrants are uncertain about their respective values of Φ. Only
after entry, which requires sinking the cost fE , is Φ revealed and remains constant afterwards.
We assume that Φ follows the Pareto distribution. More precisely, we let the c.d.f. be G (Φ) =
1− Φ−k, with a shape parameter k > max {2, σ − 1} and the support [1,+∞) .10 Note that we
9Bergin and Glick (2007) also discuss variety-specific trade costs.
10The Pareto assumption has been made in a large number of related papers (e.g., Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple
(2004), Chaney (2008), Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006)). The
Pareto allows for closed form solutions. The assumption k > 2 makes sure that the variance of the productivity
distribution is well-defined, and k > σ − 1 guarantees that the equilibrium distribution of firm sizes has a finite
mean. The shape parameter can be interpreted as an inverse measure of productivity dispersion; see Helpman,
Melitz, and Yeaple (2004).
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need not restrict in any way the stochastic processes that govern the components of Φ (ω) .
Along with variable distribution costs τ (ω) , any firm has to sink fixed distribution costs in
all markets in which it wishes to be active. These costs are associated to the establishment of a
wholesale affiliate and may take the guise of various costs of logistics (warehousing, etc.). Let
fj = fwj be the flow fixed costs of entry paid in foreign labor, and assume that fij = φijfj ,
with φij > 1 for i 6= j, and φii = 1, so that firms’ fixed distribution costs in the foreign country
are higher than in the home economy. Trade intermediaries are assumed to originate in country
j so that they enjoy cheaper access to foreign markets than foreign producers. Whenever i 6= j,
we call fij wholesale FDI (henceforth: WFDI).11
The fact that producers face higher fixed distribution costs abroad may have two reasons.
First, trade costs may simply have a firm-specific fixed component which is larger in foreign
markets due to additional costs associated to linguistic, legal or informational issues. Second,
φij may represent the higher foreign expropriation risk (e.g., because of ill-defined property
rights). To see this, let δij denote the Poisson rate of expropriation and assume that δii = 0
for the sake of simplicity. Then, φij would be equal to
(
δ¯ + δij
)
/δ¯ which is a strictly increasing
function of δij . Hence, expropriation risk works just as a higher depreciation rate on foreign
assets.
We want to understand how the differences in terms of competitive advantage Q across
producers determines their choice of foreign market entry mode: through a wholly owned foreign
sales affiliate or through a trade intermediary. For that purpose, we first briefly show how
domestic profits and profits achieved through foreign sales affiliates depend on Φ. Discussion of
profits through intermediation is less standard and discussed in more detail in the next section.
Domestic sales. Operating profits from domestic sales are τ (ω) ·Hi [τ (ω) p (ω)]−σ ζ (ω)σ−1 ·
[p (ω)− a (ω)wi]− fi. The presence of the term τ (ω) reflects the presence of non-zero variable
distribution costs also for domestic sales. The term Hi [τ (ω) p (ω)]
−σ ζ (ω)σ−1 describes a house-
hold’s level of demand for a variety ω. The term [p (ω)− a (ω)wi] refers to the per unit margin
of the price over marginal cost. Monopolistic producers in country i set their ex factory price
11Krautheim (2007b) uses the term export-supporting FDI instead of WFDI. Essentially, this is just a reinter-
pretation of the fixed costs of exporting in the original Melitz (2003) model.
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as pi (ω) = a (ω)wi/ρ so that domestic profits per period are
piDi (Q) = w
1−σ
i BiQ− fi. (4)
Domestic profits are an increasing function of competitive advantage Q. The components of Q
(marketability, brand reputation, and productivity) do not matter separately for profits. The
term Bi ≡ (1− ρ)Hiρσ−1 is an aggregate magnitude which captures the size of the market and
is taken as exogenous by producers. Domestic profits increase in the size of the home market
Bi reflecting larger demand at constant profit margins; obviously, they fall in fixed costs of
production, f , and in the domestic wage rate wi.
Foreign sales through affiliate. The monopolist generates non-negative profits from ex-
porting via an own affiliate, if export revenues suffice to cover additional variable production
costs and the annuitized costs of foreign investment φijfj .12 Profits from exporting through an
own sales affiliate are τ ij (ω) ·Hj [τ ij (ω) p (ω)]−σ ζ (ω)σ−1 · [p (ω)− a (ω)wi] − φijfi. Using the
monopolist’s optimal pricing rule, this gives
piFij (Q) = (wiτ¯ ij)
1−σ BjQ− φijfj , (5)
where the systematic part of trade costs τ¯1−σij appears as an additional determinant of variable
profits, along with the foreign measure of market size Bj and the costs of investing abroad, φijfj .
Again, profits increase in the degree of competitive advantage Q and market size Bj ; they fall
in effective unit costs wiτ¯ ij , the expropriation risk φij and the fixed costs of maintaining the
foreign distribution network fj .
2.3 Trade intermediation
Assumptions. An intermediary is “...an economic agent who purchases from suppliers for
resale or who helps sellers and buyers to meet and transact” (Spulber, 1999, p. 3). We view trade
intermediaries as wholesale agents that facilitate transactions between producers and consumers
from different countries. In particular, we postulate that trade intermediaries have superior
knowledge of foreign market conditions, legal institutions, idiosyncratic consumer preferences,
etc. than the producer herself. Being incorporated in the foreign country, they have the same
12Recall the assumption of perfect capital markets.
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fixed distribution costs than producers in the same country, fj = fwj .13 We do not explicitly
model a retail sector; our assumption of variable trade costs accruing also for domestic sales
may be thought of a very parsimonious way to capture the resource use of retailing when there
are no specific contractual or strategic interactions between wholesellers and retailers.
We assume that trade intermediaries, just like producers, are single product firms. While
this is in line with most existing trade models, in reality, many trade intermediaries have di-
versified product portfolios. In some circumstances, this may alter their pricing behavior due
to a cannibalization effect (Feenstra and Hong, 2007). Under the assumption of monopolistic
competition, however, this effect does not materialize (Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2006).
If intermediaries may sell a range of varieties and the fixed costs of distribution rise less than
proportionally with the number of varieties, then intermediation gives rise to economies of scope.
Fixed costs of market access are then endogenous, but constant over all intermediaries (which
are homogeneous in our model). Our main mechanisms are, however, robust to endogenizing
the fixed costs of market access.14
Finally, we assume that producers and intermediaries cannot write enforceable cross-country
contracts on quantities and prices and that the variety to be exchanged features some export
market specificity. This might be the case if the product has to meet some specific technical
standards that prevent it from being fully ‘recycled’.15 The lack of ex ante contracts exposes the
producer to potential hold-up: the intermediary can deny the order ex post, i.e., after production
has taken place. This assumption is crucial in that it provides an endogenous rationale for lower
variable revenues when the producer opts for the intermediated export mode. Variants of this
assumption have been used by Helpman and Grossman (2002) or in Antras and Helpman (2004,
2008) in the context of vertical relations between final goods and intermediate inputs producers.
13The intermediary’s specific knowledge could also translate into lower variable (distribution) costs. However,
the largest portion of variable distribution costs such as warehousing, transportation services, etc. are the same
across export modes.
14In Felbermayr and Jung (2008) we study endogenous fixed market access costs..
15This ‘recycling’ process may be, of course, a metaphor for many things: sales in the foreign market may
require market-specific adjustments, so that selling a shipment elsewhere requires undoing these changes; one
could also think about a situation where, in case of disagreement, a shipment needs to be shipped back from the
foreign country to the producer, thereby causing additional transportation costs.
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The game between producers and intermediaries. As in Antras and Helpman (2004),
there is an infinitely elastic supply of intermediaries in every country. Each producer P who
finds it optimal to search for a trade intermediary M , makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, which
specifies an upfront-fee for participation T (ω) in the relationship that has to be paid by M.
This fee can be positive or negative, and may be interpreted as a franchising fee paid by M to
P or as a down-payment of P to M towards financing fixed foreign distribution costs. There
is full information on product characteristics ω, so that prospective intermediaries would know
that a variety offered by some producer is already sold by another intermediary. In that case,
both intermediaries would see their operative profits driven to zero by Bertrand competition
and would thereby not be able to recover T . It follows that all producer-dealer relationships in
equilibrium involve exclusive dealership arrangements in that each producer is matched to at
most one intermediary in every market.
With the supply of M infinitely elastic, M ’s profits from the relationship net of the partic-
ipation fee in equilibrium are equal to its outside option, which we have set zero. Hence, T (ω)
will indeed differ across varieties: the higher the competitive advantage of a variety, the larger
the fee that the producer can extract from the trade intermediary. However, while perfect com-
petition for producers leaves trade intermediaries without rents ex post, they can still hold up
the producers. Due to the lack of enforceable contracts, the producer cannot be sure to receive
adequate payment for the output delivered to the trade intermediary. The latter can refuse
delivery until the price is low enough. Following Grossman and Helpman (2002) or Antras and
Helpman (2004), we assume that the countervailing incentives of producers and intermediaries
are sorted out via the usual asymmetric Nash bargaining process, where β¯ij ∈ [0, 1] is the bar-
gaining power of a producer from country i with an intermediary located in country j. At the
bargaining stage, the producer is particularly vulnerable since production costs are sunk at the
time of bargaining. If bargaining fails, the producer can recycle the goods that were meant for
exports, thereby partly recovering a fraction λij ∈ [0, 1] of the inputs used in production.16
We may summarize the sequencing of the game between the trader M and the producer P.
First, the producer P effectively auctions an exclusive dealership relationship with a trade inter-
mediary. Second, if some M has accepted the offer, P decides about the quantity τ ij (ω)xMij (ω)
16Note that λij measures how specific the product is to the respective export market.
11
to produce for the purpose of exports.17 Finally, P delivers the goods to M, M sells the goods,
and P and M bargain about sharing of revenues.
As usual, the game is solved by backward induction. The joint surplus generated on the
foreign market is given by
Jij (ω) = pMij (ω)x
M
ij
[
pMij (ω)
]− p˜iPij (ω)− fj , (6)
where xMij
[
pMij (ω)
]
is the level of foreign demand at a c.i.f. price pMij (ω) and fj = fwj is fixed
foreign costs of distribution incurred by M .
The producer’s outside option p˜iPij (ω) is the amount of the numeraire input that firm ω can
recover when bargaining fails
p˜iPij (ω) = λijτ ij (ω)x
M
ij (ω) a (ω)wi, (7)
where τ ij (ω)xMij (ω) is the amount of production required to deliver the quantity x
M
ij to the
foreign market. If λij = 0, there is no alternative use for the goods delivered to the foreign
market; if λij = 1, production can be entirely and costlessly unwinded.
The Nash solution of the bargaining problem between the producer and the intermediary
requires that M receives a pay-off
(
1− β¯ij
)
Jij (ω), while the producer gets β¯ijJij (ω)+ p˜i
P
ij (ω) .
Predicting its share of the surplus at the bargaining stage, the producer chooses the optimal
quantity to supply to the intermediary. She solves
max
xMij (ω)
β¯ijJij (ω) + p˜i
P
ij (ω)− xMij (ω) τ ij (ω) a (ω)wi (8)
subject to the demand function (3). The quantity choice of the producer finally determines the
price that the consumer in the foreign country ends up paying. The following lemma states that
price.
Lemma 1 (Pricing behavior) The c.i.f. price charged for imports from country i into the
foreign market j is given by
pMij (ω) =
τ ij (ω) a (ω)wi
βijρ
, (9)
where β¯ij ≤ βij = βij
(
β¯ij , λij
) ≡ β¯ij/ [1− λij (1− β¯ij)] ≤ 1.
17xMij (ω) is the quantity demanded by foreign consumers, which implies the production of τ ij (ω)x
M
ij (ω) units
due to loss in transit.
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The foreign price is determined as effective marginal costs τ ij (ω) a (ω)wi multiplied by a
markup 1/(βijρ) ≥ 1. The markup 1/ρ usually arises in a model with monopolistic competition
and CES preferences. However, it is magnified by an additional factor 1/βij that arises due
to the export market specificity of the product and lack of enforceable contracts, and that is
endogenously pinned down by the parameters governing the bargaining process and by the ease
at which products can be recycled. At the bargaining stage, the producer appropriates only a
share β¯ij of the surplus, and therefore optimally restricts the output below the level that would
be optimal without intermediation.
If the intermediary has no clout in the bargaining stage, i.e., if β¯ij = 1, or if the producer
can recycle the output meant for exports at no costs, i.e., if λij = 1, then the additional markup
vanishes, i.e., 1/βij = 1.18 In the case where output is totally specialized for the respective
foreign market, i.e., if λij = 0, the additional markup factor is only driven by the bargaining
power, 1/βij = 1/β¯ij . In the limiting case where the producer has no bargaining power, we have
βij → 0 regardless of the recycling rate. Moreover, ∂βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
/∂β¯ij > 0 for all λij ∈ [0, 1)
and ∂βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
/∂λij > 0 for all β¯ij ∈ (0, 1) .
If λij and β¯ij both lie strictly below unity, then pMij (ω) > p
F
ij (ω) . Grossman and Helpman
(2002) use a similar setup in the context of outsourcing with homogeneous firms. They relate
the pricing rule (9) to the double marginalization problem that appears in vertical relationships
of monopolistic firms.19 Both, higher trade costs τ¯ ij and contractual frictions imply a higher
consumer price. However, there is a crucial difference between iceberg-type trade costs and the
effect of frictions 1/βij . The former drives up the c.i.f. price as the delivery of a good to a foreign
market requires the use of specific services which require resources in proportion to the price of
the good. In contrast, contractual frictions drive up the c.i.f. price because producers optimally
reduce supply, thereby moving up the demand schedule. Trade costs are a technological feature
while the double marginalization phenomenon is due to imperfect markets.
Finally, potential intermediaries compete for contracts with producers, so that they end up
bidding their entire ex post profits
(
1− β¯ij
)
Jij (ω) as participation fees T (ω) . The profits that
18Note that domestic sales are nested by our model of intermediation with τ¯ ii = λii = 1, or alternatively (and
less realistically), β¯ii = 1.
19Note that in our setting there is no chain of monopolies so that the term double marginalization may not be
taken literally. Still, the pricing behavior looks as if double marginalization were present.
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a producer P makes on the foreign market using an intermediary are given by the optimal
value of (8) plus the participation fee T (ω) that the producer receives. The producer’s pay-off
from the bargaining stage, plus income from the participation fee, minus variable production
costs, all evaluated at the optimal price pMij (ω) , give her total profit from exporting via a trade
intermediary as
piMij (Q) =
(
wiτ¯ ij
β˜ij
)1−σ
BjQ− fj . (10)
Given our assumptions, we can replace the firm index ω with Q. The term β˜ij = β˜ij
(
βij , σ
) ≡[
βij +
(
1− βij
)
σ
] 1
σ−1 βij ∈
[
βij , 1
]
is endogenously determined as a function of bargaining pa-
rameters βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
and the elasticity of substitution σ. We have β˜ij (0, σ) = 0, β˜ij (1, σ) = 1,
limσ→1 β˜ij
(
βij , σ
)
= βije
1−βij , and limσ→+∞ β˜ij
(
βij , σ
)
= βij . Moreover, ∂β˜ij
(
βij , σ
)
/∂βij >
0 for all βij ∈ [0, 1) and σ > 1, and ∂β˜ij
(
βij , σ
)
/∂σ < 0.20
Hence, incomplete contracts reduce the slope of the profit function piMij (Q) in a similar way
than an increase in iceberg trade costs τ¯ ij would. For given Q, the variable component of profits
is always smaller when the producer chooses a trade intermediary than when the producer
establishes an own wholesale affiliate.
Despite the fact that the producer does not directly lay out the fixed cost expenditure fj
in the foreign market, those costs are nevertheless entirely deducted from the producer’s profit.
This is due to the fact that the producer extracts all profits from the intermediary when setting
the participation fee T. Hence, fixed distribution costs are fully rolled-over from the intermediary
to the producer.
3 The choice of export modes
3.1 Sorting of firms
Firms partition endogenously into different modes along their degree of competitive advantage.
The weakest firms do not even take up domestic production as they generate insufficient revenue
to cover fixed domestic distribution costs fi. The firm that is exactly indifferent between serving
the domestic market or not is identified by the condition QDi = w
σ−1
i fi/Bi. Firms may export
and do so using different export modes. The producer that is indifferent between exporting
20The latter follows from x−1
x
< lnx, where x = βij +
 
1− βij

σ .
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through a trade intermediary and selling on the domestic market only is given by the condition
piMij
(
QMij
)
= 0, which gives
QMij =
(
wiτ¯ ij
β˜ij
)σ−1
fjB
−1
j . (11)
Finally, the producer with competitive advantage QFij achieves identical profits from serving
the foreign market in either export modes: piMij
(
QFij
)
= piFij
(
QFij
)
. This indifference condition
translates into
QFij = (wiτ¯ ij)
σ−1
(
φij − 1
1− β˜σ−1ij
)
fjB
−1
j . (12)
Clearly, for QFij > 0 we require that φij > 1; since variable revenues are lower when the firm
chooses the intermediary, there must be an off-setting gain in lower fixed market access costs for
the intermediated regime to be viable. As βij rises, β˜ij goes up as the producer can appropriate
a larger portion of the surplus, and the cut-off level QFij moves rightwards, reflecting the loss of
attractivity of establishing an own affiliate.
We may now state the condition under which intermediaries and own wholesale affiliates
coexist within some bilateral trade relationship ij.21
Lemma 2 (Existence of intermediaries) If the inequality
β˜
1−σ
ij < φij
holds, then a strictly positive non-overlapping mass of producers from country i exports to country
j in each of the two available export modes (intermediation and own foreign sales affiliates).
The condition required for complete partitioning is fairly intuitive: trade intermediation only
arises as a viable alternative to wholesale FDI if the distortion associated to it,
(
β˜
1−σ
ij
)
, is small
enough relative to the cost savings that the avoidance of FDI implies
(
φij
)
. If β˜ij < 1, for any
finite φij , there is a positive mass of firms that wish to establish a foreign sales affiliate. Note
21The following lemma does not suffice to make sure that there always exists a positive measure of firms that do
not serve the foreign market at all, i.e, that QDi < Q
M
ij . This inequality holds for some firms if
wj
wi

τ¯ij
β˜ij
σ−1
Bi >
Bj , where wi, wj , Bi, and Bj are endogenous objects which can be solved using the labor market clearing and
balanced trade conditions for all countries. As the focus of the present paper is not on whether firms export but
rather on how they do it, we refrain from determining these objects. We can derive our main theoretical results
without solving for wi, wj , Bi, and Bj .
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the role of the elasticity of substitution between different varieties: if σ is very small, even a
small (effective) cost disadvantage implied by intermediation reduces export revenue by a large
amount, making wholesale FDI comparably attractive.
We have ∂β˜ij/∂β¯ij > 0 and ∂β˜ij/∂λij > 0. Hence, when the bargaining power of the producer
β¯ij is higher in some export market or her outside option better, the loss of revenue implied by
intermediation is smaller.
Note that the partitioning of producers into different export modes neither depends on
variable transport costs τ¯ ij nor on the (endogenous) size of the export market, as proxied by
Bj , or the wage rate. These variables affect both modes in similar fashion.
Figure 1 relates the firms’ sorting pattern to their degree of competitive advantage. This
picture is a modified version of figure 1 in Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), where the sorting
of firms into exporters and firms producing abroad also involves a trade-off between fixed and
variable costs, in their case the proximity-concentration trade-off. In the present context, the
trade-off is between variable revenue and fixed costs of foreign market access. And, importantly,
the slope of the profit functions shown in Figure 1 is endogenously determined as a function of the
producers’ bargaining power β¯ij , the technology parameter λij , and the elasticity of substitution
σ.
−φijfj
pimodeij
−fj
piDi
piFij
piMij
Q
−fi
Exit
FDI
Exports
viavia inter-
Exports
mediary
Domestic
sales only
QMij Q
F
ijQ
D
i
1
Figure 1: Firms sort into different export modes according to competitive advantage Q.
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We can now use Figure 1 and state the first proposition of our paper.
Proposition 1 Under the condition stated in Lemma 2, producers endogenously select into
export modes as a function of their degree of competitive advantage. Firms with high levels of
productivity, easily tradable variants, or a strong brand reputation, establish own subsidiaries,
while those with intermediate values of the above characteristics search for intermediaries. Firms
with low values of the above characteristics do not export.
Proof. Directly follows from Lemma 2 and Figure 1.
Proposition 1 implies that – as an export market grows in size (i.e., Bj increases) – medium-
size producers switch from using trade intermediaries to establishing own foreign sales affiliates,
while smaller firms start exporting via an intermediary.
3.2 The prevalence of export modes
Sales of firm Q in either mode are simple log-linear functions of firms’ competitive advantage
sMij (Q) = σ
(
wiτ¯ ij
βij
)1−σ
BjQ and sFij (Q) = σ (wiτ¯ ij)
1−σ BjQ . (13)
Clearly, in each mode, sales are larger the greater is the degree of competitive advantage (Q), the
smaller are systematic transportation costs (τ¯ ij) and the more income the foreign market has
(Bj) . Sales per firm also increase in σ as the markup goes down and the firm has to sell larger
quantities to amortize fixed costs. The more severe contractual imperfections 1/βij are, the
lower sales per firm channeled through intermediaries, whereas exports per firm via wholesale
affiliates in not affected by the contracting environment.22
We can compute the value of total export sales of country i to country j that are facilitated
by trade intermediaries SMij .
23 With Φ distributed according to the Pareto distribution, as
assumed above, aggregate export sales of country i to country j via intermediaries are given by
SMij = Ψijβ
σ−1
ij
β˜k−(σ−1)ij −
(
1− β˜σ−1ij
φij − 1
)k¯ , (14)
22These observations relate to direct effects only; σ, τ¯ ij , βij also affect sales through Bj .
23We have SMij =M
E
i
R ΦFij
ΦMij
sMij (Φ) dG (Φ) , where M
E
i is the mass of entrants in country i.
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where k¯ ≡ kσ−1 − 1 is a constant, and Ψij is a variable that will turn out constant over export
modes.24 Looking at the first order effect only, intermediated exports from i to j increase
when both countries involved are larger or systematic trade costs τ¯ ij are smaller. Intermediated
exports also fall in f, the fixed costs that any foreign market presence entails.
Contractual frictions 1/βij affect intermediated export sales in several ways. First, taking
wages and market size as given, for any firm, a lower degree of contractual imperfections increases
sales through intermediaries, see (13). Second, contractual imperfections affect the selection of
producers into the intermediated distribution mode. As 1/βij goes down, more firms find it
optimal to export through trade intermediaries and either choose to establish an own sales
affiliate abroad or stop exporting to market j completely; see (11) and (12). Hence, a reduction
of contractual imperfections has a positive effect on total intermediated export sales both on
the intensive and on the extensive margin. Ignoring general equilibrium effects, the derivative
of SMij with respect to βij is positive.
25
Similarly, we can derive total exports of i into j through own wholesales affiliates SFij . Eval-
uating SFij =M
E
i
∫∞
ΦFij
sFij (Φ) dG (Φ) , we have
SFij = Ψij
(
1− β˜σ−1ij
φij − 1
)k¯
. (15)
A rise in 1/βij now does not affect sales of each single exporter in the FDI mode directly, see
(13). Total sales to affiliates, however, increase as some firms switch from using intermediaries
to establishing own affiliates so that the cut-off value QFij falls; see (12).
Without explicitly solving for Ψij , we can can now state the following proposition on the
relative prevalence of export modes:
Proposition 2 If the condition stated in Lemma 2 holds and if firms’ degree of competitive
advantage follows the Pareto distribution, the prevalence of export sales via trade intermediaries
relative to sales through affiliates, χij ≡ SMij /SFij , is
χij = β
σ−1
ij
( φij − 1
β˜
1−σ
ij − 1
)k¯
− 1
 . (16)
24The term Ψij is endogenously determined and given by Ψij =
σk
k−(σ−1)M
E
i B
k
σ−1
j (wiτ¯ ij)
−k (fwj)
−k¯
25This follows immediately from the considerations on the intensive and extensive margin above.
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This measure increases in the risk of expropriation φij and decreases in the severity of contractual
problems 1/βij. It is independent from the size of the export market as given by Bj, the wage
rates in either country, and from transportation costs τ¯ ij. It decreases in the degree of dispersion
of competitive advantage 1/k and falls in the elasticity of substitution σ. Moreover, χij decreases
in the dispersion of domestic sales, given by 1/ [k − (σ − 1)] .
The above expression (16) is formally very similar to equation (7) in HMY, with 1/βij playing
a role similar to transportation costs. However, recall that the additional markup reflects a
distortion that does not involve the use of resources while transportation costs do imply the use
of resources as part of the transported items are lost in transit. Moreover, the underlying model
mechanisms are different: our model replaces the proximity-concentration trade-off of HMY by
the tension between the costs of internalization (wholesale FDI) and the efficiency loss caused
by incomplete contracts in the case of intermediation.
Not surprisingly, when the strength of contractual imperfections increases (i.e., βij drops)
intermediation becomes more expensive relative to the use of an own wholesale affiliate; hence
relative prevalence of intermediation
(
χij
)
falls. On the other hand, sales through intermediaries
are more prevalent if the protection of property against expropriation is low (i.e., φij is high).
More interestingly, χij does not depend on the systematic component of transportation costs
(τ¯ ij). This is due to the fact that sales in both distribution modes are affected by systematic
transportation costs in the same way. Approximating τ¯ ij with bilateral geographical distance, it
follows that the relative prevalence of intermediation does not depend on geographical distance.
This is a prediction of our framework that is testable given adequate data. Also, relative
prevalence χij increases as firms become more homogeneous (k¯ →∞). In the extreme case, the
distribution of Q has a mass point at the lower bound of its support (here: normalized to unity).
If the condition in Lemma 2 is met, most firms cluster in the neighborhood of the lower bound of
the support and therefore export through intermediaries. As k¯ falls, more firms find it optimal
to establish own subsidiaries and χij falls.
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3.3 The trade-FDI relation
Total exports of country i to country j over all possible distribution modes are Xij ≡ SMij +SFij .
Hence,
Xij = Ψijβσ−1ij β˜
k−(σ−1)
ij
( β˜1−σij − 1
φij − 1
)k¯ (
β1−σij − 1
)
+ 1
 . (17)
This expression is the bilateral trade flow (gravity) equation associated to our model. It is a
somewhat generalized version of the one derived by Chaney (2008): Due to the presence of an
extensive margin (selection of firms into exporting), the first order effect of transportation costs
τ¯ ij , which in the expression above is part of Ψij , has an elasticity of k and not |1− σ| as in
models with homogeneous firms. This result of Chaney still holds in the present context, where
firms have a choice of export mode since transportation costs affect both modes similarly.
Moreover, we can express the total volume of foreign direct investment of firms headquar-
tered in country i into wholesale affiliates in country j as Fij = φijfjMEi
[
1−G
(
ΦFij
)]
=
φijfjM
E
i
(
ΦFij
)−k
, where the second equality follows from the Pareto assumption. The stock of
wholesale FDI from country i invested in country j is26
Fij = φijΨijρ
k¯
k
(
1− β˜σ−1ij
φij − 1
) k
σ−1
. (18)
This expression is related to (15) and features similar comparative statics. In particular, the
elasticities of FDI and exports, both taken with respect to the systematic component of trans-
portation costs, are identical. The comparative statics with respect to the cost of FDI φij is
more involved. A higher cost of wholesale FDI has a negative effect on the extensive margin
(fewer firms engage in wholesale FDI), but a positive effect on the intensive margin (firms who
export through an affiliate have to invest more). However, ignoring general equilibrium effects
through Ψij one can show that the extensive margin dominates. On the other hand, higher cost
of wholesale FDI also reduce total exports.
More generally, one can state the general equilibrium relationship between total exports and
the stock of bilateral wholesale FDI as follows:
Proposition 3 Wholesale FDI (Fij) and total exports (Xij) are identically affected by changes
in the systematic component of trade costs so that they appear as complements.
26Note that
 
δ¯ + δij

Fij is the flow of FDI in a stationary state.
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Proof. Totally differentiating (17) and (18) immediately reveals that Fˆij
bτ¯ ij
= Xˆij
bτ¯ ij
(where we
use the usual hat notation, i.e. xˆ = dx/x.) Hence, any change in τ¯ ij makes WFDI and exports
move in tandem.
In contrast to the results reported in the present paper, statements on the comparative statics
of WFDI or exports with respect to the risk of expropriation φij and contractual imperfections
1/βij would require a solution of the model in general equilibrium. However, models with asym-
metric countries and bilateral trade costs are close to the frontier of analytical tractability, see
HMY. Moreover, we do not expect additional testable implications from such an exercise, whose
theoretical exploration we relegate to future research.
4 Tentative empirical evidence
The present paper has a number of predictions that are – in principle – testable empirically. In
this section, we show that existing evidence using US Census data on related versus non-related
party trade and data on German foreign plants is compatible with the main results of the present
paper. Clearly, it would be worthwhile to use detailed firm-level data. We are not aware of a
data set that contains at the same time information about firms’ characteristics, their choice of
export modes by export country, and export volumes. The data situation is improving quickly;
hence, we are confident that the predictions of the present paper can be put to systematic
econometric scrutiny soon. For the time being, we are confident that the available data plus
other empirical results do allow a rough yet meaningful empirical check.
4.1 Relative prevalence
In official data, exports to wholesale affiliates for the purpose of selling to foreign consumers
appear as within-firm trade. Hence, one may use data on related-party and non-related party
exports, as collected by the US Census, to see whether sectoral and cross-country variation in
the incidence of intermediation is in line with the predictions of our paper.27 While in the
theoretical part of the paper we mainly focus on trade in final goods, exports to affiliates not
27A detailed description on the firm-level version of the data can be found in Bernard, Redding, Schott (2007).
Strictly spoken, non-related party trade also comprises exports directly to the consumer.
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only include final output goods but also intermediate inputs.28 Unfortunately, this problem is
common to the literature. The empirical analysis in HMY relies on export data from Feenstra
(1997) that do not distinguish between final goods and imports either.29 However, as we have
pointed out in footnote 8, our setting is flexible enough to nest also trade in inputs without
altering the testable implications of the model.
Compared to HMY, we discuss a different issue (the choice of export mode versus the choice
of location of production) and stress a different mechanism (contractual imperfections versus
concentration-proximity). However, we can use a similar empirical strategy on US census data
to assess the predictions of the model. While HMY study sales of foreign affiliates versus
export sales, our dependent variable relates export sales to intermediaries versus those to foreign
affiliates. Hence, our exercise is not subject to the criticism (as HMY), that it is essentially
unknown where (and by whom) products sold by foreign affiliates have been produced.
Relative prevalence and product characteristics. We strive at checking the signs of
the partial derivatives as derived in Proposition 2. For that purpose, we show unconditional
and conditional correlations. Starting with the cross-industry perspective, we need comparable
proxies for the relative prevalence of export modes, the dispersion of sales, and contractual
imperfections.
Data on related party and non-related party trade is taken from the US Census.30 To make
the export data comparable to the dispersion measures reported by HMY,31 we aggregate the
US Census data from the 6-digit NAICS level to match the BEA 3-digit industry classification.32
Since exports on that very disaggregated level in either mode may be driven by only very few
transactions, we average over the years 2000 to 2003. Finally, we restrict our analysis to the
(wide) sample of countries as considered in HMY.33 This choice makes sure that we focus on
28Using BEA data on majority owned US affiliates, Borga and Zeile (2004) find that finished goods make up
only about 20% of exports to affiliates. While we could back out the exports of finished goods to related parties,
we cannot do so for non-related party trade.
29Note that HMY is short for Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004).
30The data can be downloaded from http://sasweb.ssd.census.gov/relatedparty.
31They construct measures on the basis of different data sources for the US and Europe for 52 BEA 3-digit
manufacturing industries.
32The correspondence table can be found in the Appendix.
33The 38 countries in the sample are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia*,
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countries with strictly positive exports in both modes.
According to Proposition 2, we expect the following signs in our analysis. The relative
prevalence of export sales decreases in the dispersion of the sales distribution. Variation in the
dispersion measure derives from variation in the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution k,
and from variation in the elasticity of substitution σ. However, the latter is not only related to
sales dispersion, but also affects the strength of the intermediation impeding effect of contractual
problems 1/βij . Thus, as stated in Proposition 2, the relative prevalence of export modes de-
creases in σ. Moreover, there might be a countervailing effect running via the recycling rate λij .
If goods are very specialized (σ low), λij may be lower so that producers are more vulnerable
and contractual problems 1/βij are stronger. There is then a negative correlation between 1/βij
and σ. The total effect of σ is therefore unclear.
Our theory differs from the proximity-concentration trade-off as proposed in HMY with
regard to the role of variable trade costs: While they drive the decision between exporting and
producing abroad, they should not play a role for the relative prevalence of export modes. In
order to check this prediction of our model, we add the freight rate as a control.
Data on σ and freight rates are taken from Hanson and Xiang (2004). We match their
product classification into the BEA industry classification and are left with 27 manufacturing
industries (see Appendix C for the industry concordance). It turns out that for Motor Vehicles
(BEA industry 371) exports via an own affiliates is the most prevalent mode, while Wood and
Lumber (240) Non-Ferrous Metals (336), and Pulp and Paper (262) are prevalently exported
via intermediaries; see Appendix B for a detailed description of the data).
The analysis falls into two parts. First, we aggregate over all countries in our sample and
plot the log of relative prevalence of export modes separately against industry dispersion, the
log of elasticity of substitution, and the log of freight rate (see Figure 2). As expected, there
is a negative unconditional correlation between the relative prevalence and industry dispersion.
However, there is no clear correlation between χ and σ. This confirms our hypothesis that
contractual problems reduce the prevalence of intermediated exports. Moreover, as predicted by
Denmark, Finland*, France, Germany, Greece*, Hong Kong, Indonesia*, Ireland, Israel*, Italy, Japan, Malaysia*,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal*, Singapore, South Africa*, South Korea,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand*, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Venezuela. An asterisk indicates
countries excluded in the narrow sample.
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Figure 2: Unconditional correlations. Cross-industry variation
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our model, variable transport costs do not drive the relative prevalence of export modes. Hence,
the concentration proximity argument indeed does not play a role in determining the choice of
export modes.
Second, in order to get closer to an empirical test of the relationship proposed in Proposition
2, we run a regression of the type
lnχsj = α0 + α1DISPs + α2 lnσs + α2 lnFREIGHTs + νj + usj , (19)
where s denotes an industry and j a partner country. With respect to the estimation strategy,
we follow HMY. First, we include country fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity,
e.g. systematic trade costs (distance from the US), market size, and investment risk. Moreover,
the country fixed effect controls for multilateral resistance, thereby addressing the issue that
some countries like the Netherlands, Hong Kong, or Singapore may act as intermediaries in
entrepoˆt trade. Second, in order to address potential endogeneity bias in the US dispersion
measure, we instrument the US measure by those of four European countries (also estimated by
HMY). Finally, we cluster standard errors within BEA industries to control for correlation of
residuals due to omitted industry characteristics. The regression is based on a balanced sample
of 27× 38 = 1026 observations.
As expected, the sign of α1 is negative (α̂1 = −1.8, t-value: −2.58), while α̂2 and α̂3 are
not significantly different from 0. This result is in line with our prediction that contractual
problems–that are negatively correlated with σ–hampers exports via intermediaries. It also
confirms our hypothesis that relative prevalence is not driven by variable trade costs. Our
results are robust to restricting the sample to the 27 countries used by HMY and referred to as
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the narrow sample.34
Relative prevalence and destination country characteristics. The US Census data also
allow a rough impression on the relative prevalence of export modes with respect to destination
country characteristics like geographical distance, country size, and the degree of property rights
protection. For that purpose, we include geographical distance of country j to the USA, DISTj ,
and the size of population, POPj in our dataset.35 Moreover, we include a measure, RISKj
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) that captures the risk of expropriation and
confiscation of productive assets by the state or other actors in country j. According to our
model, firms use an intermediary instead of setting up an own wholesale affiliation if this risk is
high.36
We aggregate the trade data over all of our 27 industries and find that Austria and the
NAFTA trading partners Canada and Mexico are mainly served via own affiliates, while coun-
tries like Peru, Indonesia, and South Korea are prevalently exported to via intermediaries; see
Appendix N for a detailed summary statistic.37
Turning to the unconditional effects of our explanatory variables, Figure 3 suggests that
higher risk of confiscation or expropriation (RISKj), leads to relatively higher exports via
intermediaries. This result is well in line with our theory. Relative prevalence and geographical
distance seem to correlate positively, while our model would predict that distance as a proxy
for variable trade costs does not affect the prevalence of export modes. However, the result is
obviously driven by trade within NAFTA (Canada and Mexico). If we omit NAFTA trading
partners, there is no significant relation. Finally, Figure 3 shows that market size, measured in
terms of population, does not affect the choice of export mode as predicted by our model.
34The coefficient of dispersion slightly increases in absolute values (bα1 = −1.9).
35The distance data is provided by Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII)
in Paris on their website www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/distances.htm; population (for year 2000) comes from
the World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the World Bank.
36The variable investment profile in the ICRG attaches high scores to low risk. However, we invert the values
to obtain our measure RISKj .
37The high level of exports to Austria channeled through sales affiliates may point to its role as re-exporter
to neighboring countries. We will control for that by including a measure of multilateral resistance into the
cross-country regressions.
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Figure 3: Unconditional correlations. Cross-country variation
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We also run a regression of the type
lnχsj = β0+β1 lnRISKj+β2 lnDISTj+β3NAFTAj+β4 lnMRj+β5 lnPOPj+νs+usj , (20)
where MRj measures the multilateral resistance of country j, which is related to the price
index Pj in our model.38 As expected, the relative prevalence increases in RISK (β̂1 = −.32,
t-value: 2.11). Moreover, we find that distance and multilateral resistance have no significant
impact on the relative prevalence of export modes.
Interestingly, while in the plot of Figure 3 market size measured by POPj seemed unrelated
to the relative prevalence of intermediation, it appears significant in the conditional regression
where χsj decreases in country size (β̂5 = −0.22, t-value: −2.71). This means that firms tend to
serve larger markets via own sales affiliates and smaller markets via intermediaries. This is not
in line with the predictions of our model, where larger markets attract more exports through a
proportional expansion of both modes.39
One can rationalize the empirical finding by assuming a relation between fixed foreign market
access costs and country size. If those costs depend positively on country size, e.g., because more
sales agents need to be hired, but increase less strongly in the case of wholesale FDI, e.g., because
the foreign firm loses some of its initial cost disadvantage relative to domestic firms as it grows
larger, then relative prevalence of intermediation declines in population. Another explanation
may involve the fact that firms are risk averse, so that the hold-up problem implicit in the
38Following the literature, multilateral resistance is the GDP weighted distance of country j to all other countries
than the US.
39This phenomenon seems to be common to the literature: Bernard, Jensen, Redding, Schott (2007) find a
negative relationship between the share of intra-firm imports and country size as measured by log population.
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intermediated mode becomes fiercer when the profits at stake are larger (which is the case in a
larger country). Finally, the Pareto assumption, while found realistic in many empirical studies
of firm size distributions, may not be adequate. In this case, the expression describing relative
prevalence is no longer independent (amongst other things) from country size.
Our empirical exercise is in line with a number of predictions of the model, supporting our
view that the choice of export mode reflects a trade-off between the costs of contractual frictions
in the case of intermediation and the cost of FDI in the case of internalization. The fact that
the data show a negative relationship between the prevalence of intermediation and market size
suggests an interesting research agenda in which fixed costs of foreign market access are modeled
with more detail.
4.2 The FDI-distance nexus
Citing various empirical studies, Neary (2007) points out that – in the cross-section of countries
– distance is negatively correlated to the stock and flow of foreign direct investment (FDI).
In other words, destination countries that are farther away from the source country receive
less FDI. This seems inconsistent with the concentration-proximity trade-off in the standard
model of horizontal FDI, where producers overcome the cost of distance by establishing foreign
production plants. Buch, Kleinert, Lipponer, and Toubal (2005) provide a nice example for
German data; controlling for destination country size and similarity with the source country,
they find that distance reduces sales of foreign affiliates, regardless of whether these subsidiaries
are active in production or wholesale activities. HMY present evidence that is in line with
concentration-proximity, but focus on cross-industry variance in trade costs.
Our paper predicts that sales of wholesale affiliates decline in distance, exactly for the same
reason that this is true for traditional exports. Also, the number of firms engaged in running
foreign wholesale affiliates declines with distance. Hence, the very rudimentary theory of FDI
present in our paper fits the data. If wholesale activities are sufficiently important for total FDI,
then it may well be that aggregate data exhibit a negative relationship between affiliate sales
and distance as well. In Germany, for example, in 2005, about 27 percent of the total value of
foreign FDI was in the wholesale sector.40
40The total stock of FDI used as a base does not include the financial sector (in particular holding companies
and off-shore investment vehicles).
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5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have discussed the choice between two different modes of exporting to a foreign
market: a producer can either use a foreign trade intermediary, who enjoys a fixed cost advantage
but – due to the lack of enforceable cross-country contracts – exposes the producer to a hold-up
problem, or they can establish an own wholesale affiliate, avoiding the threat of hold-up at the
cost of increased investment. This trade-off produces an interesting sorting pattern of producers
into the two export modes. Firms with high perceived quality of their products, low variable
production costs, and strong marketability of goods prefer to establish affiliates; firms with
low realizations of those characteristics prefer to use trade intermediaries. The reason is that
contractual frictions reduce variable revenues proportionally, while the fixed-cost disadvantage
of affiliates does not depend on sales. Hence, firms with high sales opt for wholesale subsidiaries
in the foreign country.
Importantly, in our model, variable trade costs are endogenously determined in the game
between the producer and the intermediary. However, the contractual frictions are not isomor-
phic to the usual iceberg-type trade costs, since they do not lead to a loss of output. Rather,
they imply an additional restriction of production by monopolistically competitive firms, so
that the markup goes up. Hence, our model warns against modeling differences across modes
as exogenous differences in iceberg-type variable trade costs.
Under the assumption of the Pareto distribution, we show that the relative prevalence of
intermediation does not depend on transportation costs between the source and the destination
country, on market size or on wage rates. It increases with the risk of expropriation of foreign
assets and in the degree of heterogeneity of producers. It falls with the severity of contractual
problems and the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Our paper is related to Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). While we discuss a different
issue (the choice of export mode versus the choice of location of production) and stress a different
mechanism (contractual imperfections versus concentration-proximity), we can use a related
empirical strategy on US census data to assess the predictions of the model. We find that most
predictions of our theory are in line with the data.
We close the paper with a brief outlook on further research. First, while capturing an im-
portant trade-off between contractual frictions and the cost of internalization through wholesale
FDI, our model of endogenously arising trade intermediation is only a first pass at a complex
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issue. In order to improve our understanding of trade costs further, one may want to develop a
more realistic model of multi-product trade intermediaries. Second, our empirical analysis draws
on sectoral data; a firm-level analysis would be preferable. As soon as data on firms’ choices of
export modes becomes available, one can put a wider array of implications of our model to a
test.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs and detailed derivations
Proof of Lemma 1 (pricing behavior). The producer maximizes her expected profits from
exporting via a trade intermediary subject to the demand function to choose her optimal quantity
to supply in the match. Using optimal demand to substitute out the c.i.f price and inserting (7)
the solves
max
xMij (ω)
β¯ijJij (ω) + p˜i
P
ij (ω)− xMij (ω) τ ij (ω) a (ω)wi
= max
xMij (ω)
β¯ijp
M
ij (ω)x
M
ij (ω) +
[(
1− β¯ij
)
λij − 1
]
xMij (ω) τ ij (ω) a (ω)wi
= max
xMij (ω)
β¯ij (Hj)
1/σ ζ (ω)(σ−1)/σ
[
xMij (ω)
](σ−1)/σ
+
[(
1− β¯ij
)
λij − 1
]
xMij (ω) τ ij (ω) a (ω)wi
The first order condition is
ρβ¯ij (Hj)
1
σ ζ (ω)
σ−1
σ
[
xMij (ω)
]− 1
σ =
[(
1− β¯ij
)
λij − 1
]
τ ij (ω) a (ω)wi.
Substituting xMij (ω) yields the pricing rule stated in Lemma 1
pMij (ω) =
τ ij (ω) a (ω)wi
βijρ
,
where βij = βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
= β¯ij/
[
1− λij
(
1− β¯ij
)] ≥ β¯ij .
Comparative statics related to Lemma 1. The additional markup is inverse proportional
to the degree of contractual imperfections βij . βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
is increasing in the bargaining power
β¯ij and the recycling rate λij
∂βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
∂β¯ij
=
1− λij(
1− λij
(
1− β¯ij
))2 > 0,
∂βij
(
β¯ij , λij
)
∂λij
=
(
1− β¯ij
)
β¯ij(
1− λij
(
1− β¯ij
))2 > 0.
The term β˜ij = β˜ij
(
βij , σ
) ≡ [βij + (1− βij)σ] 1σ−1 βij ≥ βij is closely related to our measure of
contractual imperfections βij . We have β˜ij (0, σ) = 0 and β˜ij (1, σ) = 1β˜ij is strictly increasing
in βij for βij ∈ (0, 1)
∂β˜ij
(
βij , σ
)
∂βij
=
β˜ij
β
(
1− βij
βij +
(
1− βij
)
σ
)
> 0,
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since βij/
[
βij +
(
1− βij
)
σ
]
< 1.
The derivative with respect to σ is given by
∂β˜ij
∂σ
= β˜ij
(
− ln
[
βij +
(
1− βij
)
σ
]
(σ − 1)2 +
1− βij[
βij +
(
1− βij
)
σ
])
∂β˜ij
∂σ
=
β˜ij
σ − 1
βij +
(
1− βij
)
σ − 1− [βij + (1− βij)σ] ln [βij + (1− βij)σ]
(σ − 1) [βij + (1− βij)σ] < 0.
β˜ij is strictly decreasing in σ, since
x−1
x < lnx, where x = βij +
(
1− βij
)
σ.
Moreover, β˜ij is well behaved in the limiting cases
lim
σ→1
β˜ij
(
βij , σ
)
= βij exp
[
lim
σ→1
(
ln
(
βij +
(
1− βij
)
σ
)
σ − 1
)]
= βij exp
[
lim
σ→1
(
1− βij
βij +
(
1− βij
)
σ
)]
= βije
1−βij ,
lim
σ→∞ β˜ij
(
βij , σ
)
= βij exp
[
lim
σ→∞
(
ln
(
βij +
(
1− βij
)
σ
)
σ − 1
)]
= βij exp
[
lim
σ→1
(
1− βij
βij +
(
1− βij
)
σ
)]
= βij .
Proof of Lemma 2 (Existence of intermediation. The cutoff QMij immediately follows
from rearranging (10)
QMij =
(
wiτ¯ ij
β˜ij
)σ−1
fjB
−1
j .
QFij is determined by solving pi
M
ij
(
QFij
)
= piFij
(
QFij
)
for QFij
(wiτ¯ ij)
1−σ BjQFij − φijfj =
(
wiτ¯ ij
β˜ij
)1−σ
BjQ
F
ij − fj
QFij = (wiτ¯ ij)
σ−1
(
φij − 1
1− β˜σ−1ij
)
fjB
−1
j
= QMij
(
φij − 1
β˜
1−σ
ij − 1
)
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Sorting exists, if QFij is strictly larger than Q
M
ij :
(wiτ¯ ij)
σ−1
(
φij − 1
1− β˜σ−1ij
)
fjB
−1
j >
(
wiτ¯ ij
β˜ij
)σ−1
fjB
−1
j
φij − 1 > β˜
1−σ
ij
(
1− β˜σ−1ij
)
φij > β˜
1−σ
ij .
Derivations of equations (14) and (15) (Export sales per mode). Sales per firm from
exporting via a trade intermediary are given by
sMij (ω) = p
M
ij (ω)x
M
ij
[
pMij (ω)
]
= Hj
[
pMij (ω)
ζ (ω)
]1−σ
sMij (Q) = σ
(
wiτ¯ ij
βij
)1−σ
QBj .
UsingQ = Φ(1−σ) and the Pareto distribution, total exports via intermediaries can be calculated
as
SMij = M
E
i σ
(
wi
τ¯ ij
βij
)1−σ
Bjk
∫ ΦFij
ΦMij
Φσ−k−2dΦ
= MEi
(
wi
τ¯ ij
βij
)1−σ
Bj
σk
k − (σ − 1)
[(
ΦMij
)σ−k−1 − (ΦFij)σ−k−1]
= MEi σ
(
wi
τ¯ ij
βij
)1−σ
Bj
σk
k − (σ − 1)
(
ΦFij
)σ−k−1 ( φij − 1
β˜
1−σ
ij − 1
) k−(σ−1)
σ−1
− 1

= MEi (wiτ¯ ij)
−k B
k
σ−1
j f
−k¯
j
σk
k − (σ − 1)β
σ−1
ij
(
φij − 1
1− β˜σ−1ij
)σ−k−1
σ−1
( φij − 1
β˜
1−σ
ij − 1
) k−(σ−1)
σ−1
− 1

= Ψijβσ−1ij
β˜k−(σ−1)ij −
(
1− β˜σ−1ij
φij − 1
)k¯ .
The last expression is equivalent to (14) in the text. Analogously, sales per firm from
exporting via a wholesale affiliate take the form
sFij (ω) = pij (ω)xij [pij (ω)]
sFij (Q) = σ (wiτ¯ ij)
1−σ QBj ,
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and
SFij = M
E
i σ (wiτ¯ ij)
1−σ Bjk
∫ Φ∞ij
ΦFij
Φσ−k−2dΦ
= MEi (wiτ¯ ij)
1−σ Bj
σk
k − (σ − 1)
(
ΦFij
)σ−k−1
= Ψij
(
1− β˜σ−1ij
φij − 1
)k¯
.
which corresponds to (15) in the text. Note that
k¯ =
k
σ − 1 − 1
dk¯
σ
σ
k¯
= − σ
σ − 1
k
k − (σ − 1) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Relative prevalence). The relative prevalence of export modes
χij ≡ SMij /SFij follows immediatly from (14) and (15)
χij =
βσ−1ij
[
β˜
k−(σ−1)
ij −
(
1−β˜σ−1ij
φij−1
)k¯]
(
1−β˜σ−1ij
φij−1
)k¯
= βσ−1ij
β˜k−(σ−1)ij
(
φij − 1
1− β˜σ−1ij
)−k¯
− 1

= βσ−1ij
( φij − 1
β˜
1−σ
ij − 1
)k¯
− 1
 .
Comparative statics results are derived as follows:
dχij
dφij
φij
χij
= k¯
φij
φij − 1
(
φij−1
β˜
1−σ
ij −1
)k¯
(
φij−1
β˜
1−σ
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)k¯
− 1
> 0
dχij
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βij
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= (σ − 1)
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β˜
1−σ
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β˜
1−σ
ij −1(
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− 1
k¯
dβ˜ij
dβij
βij
dβ˜ij
 > 0,
since dβ˜ijdβij
βij
dβ˜ij
> 0 and φij−1
β˜
1−σ
ij −1
> 1 (Lemma 2).
dχij
dτ¯ ij
τ¯ ij
χij
= 0
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dχij
dσ
σ
χij
≡ ζ = σ lnβij+k¯
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))
(
φij−1
β˜
1−σ
ij −1
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since dk¯dσ
σ
k¯
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σ
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Once you assume λij = f (σ) with f ′ > 0, dβijdσ σβij > 0, and we have
dχij
dσ
σ
χij
= ζ + (σ − 1) dβij
dσ
σ
βij
,
the sign of which is unclear.
Derivation of equation (18). The stock of wholesale FDI is given by
Fij = φijfjM
E
i
[
1−G (ΦFij)]
= φijfjM
E
i
(
ΦFij
)−k
= φijfjM
E
i
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−k B
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φij − 1
) k
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k¯
k
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1− β˜σ−1ij
φij − 1
) k
σ−1
.
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B Summary statistics
Cross-industry
BEA Description χ DISP SIGMA FREIGHT
371 Motor Vehicles 0.2 2.2 7.1 0.10
305 Rubber 0.9 1.6 3.6 0.12
341 Metal Cans, Fabricated Metal 0.9 1.9 4.9 0.09
283 Drugs 1.0 2.1 9.5 0.03
363 Household Appliances 1.2 2.5 5.9 0.06
386 Optical and Photographic Equipment 1.3 1.8 8.1 0.05
357 Computers 1.3 2.0 11.0 0.04
284 Soap and Cleansing Products 1.3 1.9 5.5 0.09
308 Miscellaneous Plastics 1.5 1.6 6.0 0.13
287 Agricultural Chemicals 1.6 1.6 1.3 0.18
343 Heating and Plumbing Equipment 1.7 1.8 4.4 0.13
381 Scientific and Measuring Equipment 2.0 2.3 6.7 0.05
220 Textiles 2.1 1.8 7.8 0.11
366 Audio,Video,Communications Equipment 2.1 2.0 9.4 0.04
329 Stone, Minerals, and Ceramics 2.2 1.5 2.7 0.11
250 Furniture 2.3 1.7 3.6 0.16
310 Leather 2.4 1.7 8.9 0.07
351 Engines and Turbines 2.5 2.6 7.9 0.06
356 General Industrial Machinery 2.6 1.7 7.0 0.07
354 Metalworking Machinery 3.2 1.4 8.1 0.06
230 Apparel 3.6 1.6 5.6 0.09
355 Special Industrial Machinery 3.9 1.6 8.5 0.07
331 Ferrous metals 4.5 1.9 3.5 0.12
379 Other Transport Equipment 4.7 1.7 7.4 0.05
262 Pulp and Paper 5.2 1.3 4.3 0.14
335 Non-Ferrous metals 5.8 1.5 6.7 0.06
240 Wood and Lumber 6.1 1.5 4.0 0.15
Note: Ranked by prevalence of export sales via related relative to non-related parties
39
Cross-country
ISO Name χ RISK DIST POP
AUT Austria 0.9 55.3 6.8 8.1
MEX Mexico 1.0 57.8 3.4 100.0
CAN Canada 1.0 54.5 0.5 31.1
NLD Netherlands 1.3 53.0 5.9 16.1
BEL Belgium 1.4 56.7 5.9 10.3
JPN Japan 1.4 58.5 10.9 127.0
GER Germany 1.7 55.4 6.0 82.4
IRL Ireland 1.7 57.3 5.1 3.9
GRC Greece 2.2 57.3 7.9 11.0
ISR Israel 2.3 65.4 9.1 6.3
FRA France 2.3 55.5 5.8 59.7
GBR United Kingdom 2.5 53.3 5.6 59.2
ARG Argentina 3.2 76.0 8.5 37.3
AUS Australia 3.2 59.6 16.0 19.6
SGP Singapore 3.4 53.4 15.4 4.1
PHL Philippines 3.5 62.1 13.7 78.7
MYS Malaysia 3.6 67.8 15.1 24.3
ITA Italy 3.9 56.9 6.9 57.3
THA Thailand 4.0 65.2 13.9 63.2
DNK Denmark 4.1 56.3 6.2 5.4
FIN Finland 4.1 55.7 6.6 5.2
BRA Brazil 4.1 70.6 7.7 175.0
COL Colombia 4.3 70.5 4.0 43.5
HKG Hong Kong 4.7 58.4 13.0 6.7
ZAF South Africa 4.8 61.9 12.6 45.3
SWE Sweden 5.2 56.5 6.3 8.9
PRT Portugal 5.6 55.2 5.4 10.3
ESP Spain 5.8 53.6 5.8 41.1
VEN Venezuela 5.9 77.4 3.4 24.7
TWN Taiwan 5.9 56.3 12.5 22.5
CHL Chile 6.1 59.7 8.3 15.5
CHE Switzerland 6.2 57.8 6.3 7.2
NZL New Zealand 6.3 56.7 14.5 3.9
TUR Turkey 7.4 67.2 8.1 67.8
NOR Norway 8.0 58.8 5.9 4.5
KOR South Korea 8.4 64.8 11.1 47.5
IDN Indonesia 8.5 80.9 16.2 209.0
PER Peru 8.8 69.1 5.9 25.8
Note: Ranked by prevalence of export sales via related relative
to non-related parties; RISK takes scores between 0 (lowest) and
100 (highest); DIST in thousands; POP in millions;
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C Industry concordance
BEA Description SITC NAICS
220 Textiles 65 313, 314
230 Apparel 84 315
240 Wood and Lumber 63 321
250 Furniture 82 337
262 Pulp and Paper 64 3221
283 Drugs 54 3254
284 Soap and Cleansing Products 55 3256
287 Agricultural Chemicals 56 3253
305 Rubber 62 3262
308 Miscellaneous Plastics 57,58 3261
310 Leather 61 316
329 Stone, Minerals, and Ceramics 66 3271
331 Ferrous metals 67 3211
335 Non-Ferrous metals 68 3314
341 Metal Cans, Fabricated Metal 69 3321,3324,3363
343 Heating and Plumbing Equipment 81 3323,3334
351 Engines and Turbines 71 3336
354 Metalworking Machinery 73 3335
355 Special Industrial Machinery 72 3332
356 General Industrial Machinery 74 3339
357 Computers 75 3341
363 Household Appliances 77 3352
366 Audio,Video,Communications Equipment 76 3342,3343
371 Motor Vehicles 78 3361
379 Other Transport Equipment 79 3362,3364-3366,3369
381 Scientific and Measuring Equipment 87 3345
386 Optical and Photographic Equipment 88 333314,333315
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